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Abstract. Recent years have seen an increasing interest of multiagent system
research in employing the theory of argumentation for the development of com-
munication protocols. While significant progress has been made in formalising
argument-based communication, (possibly adaptive) agent-level argumentation
strategies as a practical integration of rational agent reasoning and inter-agent
dialogue have received fairly little attention. In this paper we propose an imple-
mentation of a simplified form of argument-based negotiation using a generic
social reasoning framework. This framework allows for strategic and adaptive
communication towards private goals within the limits of rationality. The feasibil-
ity of the approach is illustrated in an agent-based web linkage scenario, showing
that its performance is comparable to that of simple proposal-based negotiation
while imposing much stricter and much more realistic constraints.
1 Introduction
Communication between intelligent agents is one of the cornerstones of multiagent
system (MAS) technology. Most of the time, this communication is realised in terms
of (1) agent communication languages (ACLs) defining the structure of messages (usu-
ally in a speech-act [4] like format) and (2) interaction protocols specifying admissible
sequences of messages and imposing constraints on the contents of these.
Recent years have seen an increasing interest in employing the theory of argumen-
tation for the development of communication protocols. This interest rests on the view
that rational agents reason and make decisions by constructing and comparing argu-
ments for and against particular conclusions [13, 11]. Hence, it is natural to view ra-
tional interaction as a disciplined process of argument exchange. As a consequence,
significant progress has been made in formalising argument-based communication,
founded in various formal theories of argumentation (e.g. [2], [14], [3]). One area of
particular interest is argumentation based negotiation (ABN) [17], in which agents ex-
change arguments in order to reach beneficial agreements.
So far, however, fairly little attention has been paid to argumentation strategies as a
practical integration of intra-agent rational reasoning and (hence, rational) inter-agent
dialogue via argument exchange.4 Even less work has been done on argumentation strat-
egy adaptation. This is paralleled in general ACL research (see e.g. [12, 7] for recent
overviews of the field), where the problem of coming up with an optimal communi-
cation strategy that obeys a given semantics,5 but still ensures beneficial interaction
outcomes for the agents themselves, is largely unresolved.
One reason why argumentation strategies and their adaptation have received fairly
little attention may be the relatively high expressiveness of argumentation protocols,
which makes them both difficult to implement and hard to control during execution. In
the light of the latter problem, however, the need for adaptive argumentation strategies
becomes even more pressing.
In this paper, we take a first step towards the use of adaptive strategies in argument-
based dialogues. For this, we conceptually follow a generic agent-centric model of
strategic interaction that makes a clear distinction between agents’ social behaviour
on the one hand and their internal rational reasoning on the other. Rational interaction
then means that agents may only engage in communication in a way that respects their
alleged mental state (as suggested by their social behaviour). We practically implement
a simplified form of argument-based negotiation using a particular instance of the InF-
FrA social reasoning framework [20]. We illustrate the feasibility of the approach in
a agent-based web linkage scenario, and show that its performance is comparable to
that of simple proposal-based negotiation while imposing much stricter and much more
realistic constraints.
The paper contributes to the state of the art in argument-based communication in
two main ways. First, it presents the first attempt to produce a highly expressive and
flexible approach to adaptive communication strategies in argument-based communi-
cation in general, and argument-based negotiation in particular. Second, our practical
implementation contributes to bridging the gap between global (argumentation) proto-
col design and rational agent design.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We first introduce a generic
model of strategic interaction in a prescriptive social context. In Section 3, we then lay
out our approach for adaptive reasoning about communication patterns. Section 4 in-
troduces interest-based negotiation, a form of argumentation-based negotiation, which
will serve as an underlying argumentation model in an application scenario. Experi-
mental results obtained in this scenario will be given in section 5. Section 6 rounds up
with some conclusions.
2 A Generic Model of Strategic Interaction
As suggested in the introductory section, the perspective we adopt towards argumenta-
tion (and towards communication in general) is entirely agent-centric. The problem we
are trying to solve can be stated as follows:
4 Preliminary work has begun to investigate the outcomes of different simple strategies in
argument-based communication [1, 15].
5 We mean ostensible adherence to a given semantics here, e.g. by acting as if being in a partic-
ular mental state (for mentalistic semantics [22, 6]) or as if entering into a social commitment
(for commitment-based semantics [23, 10]).
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Fig. 1. Agent-centric model of strategic interaction
Given a set of dialogue patterns tied to constraints regarding (among other
things) participants’ internal structure, how can we design an agent that is
capable of employing these patterns – in compliance with the constraints at
hand – in order to optimise her own long-term profit?
We should take a minute to describe what is meant by this. In the most general sense,
any communication mechanism in a MAS ties the use of certain communicative pat-
terns (protocols, single utterances or publicly observable “non-linguistic” or “physi-
cal”, i.e. environment-manipulating, actions) to specific constraints, which may also
concern mental states (such as beliefs, desires, and intentions [5]) particularly of those
agents taking part in the communication. Since these prescriptive constraints are usu-
ally assumed to be common knowledge for all agents situated in the same social con-
text, they (together with the actual communication) raise mutual expectations regarding
these agents’ behaviours. As figure 1 suggests, anything that is uttered by an agent is
interpreted on the grounds of the social context and leads to the construction of a pub-
lic identity of the communicating agent. This identity reflects (1) what the agent has
publicly claimed about her internal state and (2) how this is seen to relate to her ac-
tual behaviour by other agents. However, although her utterances are generated by the
agent’s internal reasoning mechanism, the actual internal state may differ significantly
from her public identity, and this is where the strategic aspect of communication comes
into play: In contrast to the internal state of an agent, her public identity is subject to
inspection by a peer and will evoke certain reactions on her peers’ side and hence affect
the outcome of any communicative interaction. Thus, the agent herself has an incentive
to manipulate her public identity, albeit the social context confines the range of possible
manipulations.
ABN is an instance of this model that allows agents to influence their public identity
directly, namely by conveying information about their (alleged) internal state in order
to support their proposals or claims. While an agent might put forth arguments that are
not in line with her internal state, the public identity itself must be consistent so as not
to reveal this difference. Otherwise, other agents might simply refuse to interact with
the agent at all due to the latter’s inability to interact reasonably.
As an example, consider an insincere agentAwho is deliberately deceiving agentB
when claiming that she is trying to achieve goal G. In a framework of rational commu-
nication, A would be expected to act (and speak) in accordance with this commitment
to G, e.g. by not claiming to pursue contradictory goals at the same time, by dropping
the goal if it is achieved or if it becomes unachievable, etc. It is reasonable to assume
that unless A says anything that contradicts these principles of rationality (which can
be seen as a social context in the context of communication) or indicates through her
physical actions not to be pursuing G, she can maintain her public identity towards B
and keep B thinking she is in fact trying to achieve G. This is exactly what is meant by
strategic compliance to a social context: to ensure others have certain expectations about
our own future behaviour, we must succeed in maintaining a communicative stance that
is in concordance with the social context, even if our internal state and reasoning con-
tradicts the construed public identity.
3 Reasoning with Adaptive Communication Patterns
To develop agents that are capable of strategically dealing with the complex dialogue
patterns required for argumentation, we make use of the abstract social reasoning frame-
work InFFrA proposed in [21], and, more specifically, the formal model m2InFFrA sug-
gested as a concrete instance of InFFrA in [8].
The Interaction Frames and Framing Architecture InFFrA is an abstract framework
for reasoning about and learning different classes of interactions in the form of so-
called interaction frames (henceforth called frames). Each of these frames characterises
a category of interaction situations in terms of (1) roles held by the interacting parties
and relationships between them, (2) trajectories that describe the observable surface
structure of the interaction, and (3) context and belief conditions that need to hold for
the respective frame to be enacted. Further, InFFrA defines framing as the activity of
constructing, adapting and strategically applying a set of interaction frames from the
point of view (and in accordance with the private goals) of a single agent. Roughly
speaking, framing consists of four phases:
1. Interpreting the current interaction in terms of a perceived frame and matching it
against the normative model of the active frame which determines what the inter-
action should look like.
2. Assessing the active frame (based on whether its conditions are currently met,
whether its surface structure resembles the perceived interaction sequence, and
whether it serves the agent’s own goals).
3. Deciding on whether to retain the current active frame or whether to re-frame (i.e. to
retrieve a more suitable frame from one’s frame repository or to adjust an exist-
ing frame model to match the current interaction situation and the agent’s current
needs) on the grounds of the previous assessment phase.
4. Using the active frame to determine one’s next (communicative, social) action,
i.e. apply the active frame as a prescriptive model of social behaviour in the current
interaction.
The m2InFFrA framework turns these abstract concepts of interaction frames and
framing into a concrete computational model for discrete-time, two-party, turn-taking
interactions. A frame in m2InFFrA consist of (1) a trajectory, i.e. a linear sequence
of message or “physical” action patterns (possibly containing variables), (2) condi-
tion/substitution pairs that represent past enactments of the frame in terms of variable
values and conditions that held at the time of the enactment, and (3) counters that keep
track of (i) the frequency with which an encounter prefix (i.e. an initial sub-sequence
of a perceived conversation) matched the frame trajectory and (ii) the frequency with
which certain condition/substitution pairs appeared as instances of the frame. Instead of
quoting [8] for a formal definition of m2InFFrA frames, let us take a look at an illustrative
example:6
F =
〈 T︷ ︸︸ ︷〈 5
→ request(A,B,X)
3
→ do(B,X)
〉
,
〈 Θ1︷ ︸︸ ︷
{can(B,X)},
Θ2︷ ︸︸ ︷
{can(B, pay(S)}
〉
〈
C1︷ ︸︸ ︷
2
→ 〈[A/a], [B/b], [X/pay($100)]〉,
C2︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
→ 〈[A/b], [B/a], [X/pay(S)]〉
〉〉
As for the individual elements of F , the trajectory T captures the following interac-
tion experience: A has asked B five times to perform (physical) action X , B actually
did so in three of these instances.7 Knowledge about the remaining two cases would
typically be stored in a different frame. The substitutions Θ and conditions C sum-
marise the following observations: In two of the successful instances (Θ1/C1), it was
a who asked and b who heeded the request, and the action was to pay $100. In both
cases, can(b, pay($100)) held true (Ci always corresponds to Θi in a frame). In the
third case, roles were swapped between a and b and the amount S remains unspecified
(which does not mean that it did not have a concrete value, but simply that this was
abstracted away in the frame).
Thus, m2InFFrA frames facilitate the description of (observations about) dialogue
sequences by means of generalised message (and action) patterns together with past
6 For the sake of readability, we write the counter values next to the corresponding trajectory
steps and substitutions.
7 do is used as a special performative to indicate execution of physical actions.
variable values and context conditions. At the same time, they can be used as a concrete
representation for the abstract social context mentioned above, combining behavioural
expectations and context conditions in the most general way.
As for the semantics of frames, these are defined in terms of a probabilistic
model regarding the possible continuations of a dialogue. This is done based on
a domain-dependent real-valued similarity measure σ on message patterns (and se-
quences thereof). σ is defined using a distance metric between messages8 and ex-
tended into a similarity σ(ϑ, F ) between a substitution ϑ and an entire frame F
with trajectory T (F ) and substitutions Θ(F ) by summing over individual similarities
σ(T (F )ϑ, TΘi(F )) between the message pattern sequence induced by ϑ and the past
cases stored in Θ(F ). Moreover, Θi(F ) is only considered if the corresponding condi-
tion set Ci(F ) is currently satisfied.9
Given a frame repository F = {F1, . . . Fn} representing the agent’s interaction
experience, and a (possibly empty) sequence w of messages perceived in the current
conversation, the probability of encounter prefix w being concluded with w′ computes
as
P (w′|w) =
∑
F∈F ,ww′=T (F )ϑ
P (ϑ|F,w)P (F |w),
i.e. the probability that some F is enacted under a specific substitution ϑ such that ww′
equals the trajectory of F under ϑ. To compute the probabilities on the right-hand side
of this equation, we assume that P (ϑ|F,w) ∝ σ(ϑ, F ) in the sense that the likelihood
of any substitution is proportional to its similarity to a frame as compared to that of any
other substitution still possible. The probability P (F |w) is computed by looking at the
occurrence counter value corresponding to the last element of T (F ) (i.e. to T (F ) as a
whole).
Based on this probabilistic semantics, [20] defines a two-layer decision-making
and learning process: at the (lower) action level, agents use utility estimates u(w,KB)
(which are obtained, for example, by computing the utility of physical actions that oc-
cur along a dialogue sequence w under current knowledge KB and assigning a small
communication cost to each “non-physical” message) to maximise the expected utility
within the activated frame (i.e. among all substitutions that this frame still permits). This
also involves adversarial search in the space of variable substitutions the agent and her
peer may apply in their respective part(s) of the conversation. At the (upper) framing
level, which is concerned with choosing a frame to activate from a given frame reposi-
tory F , agents use a variant of hierarchical Q-learning (based on the options framework
proposed in [16]) to learn optimal re-framing strategies for changing frames during an
encounter if (1) the current frame trajectory no longer matches the perceived encounter
message sequence, (2) frame conditions no longer apply, or (3) the frame no longer
seems to offer positive utility under the optimal substitution.
To allow for the adaptation of frames from actual interaction experience, [9] ex-
tends the aforementioned distance metric on message sequences to frames and interprets
frames as clusters in the space of possible conversations. Cluster validation techniques
8 See [9] for details on this metric.
9 This assumes the agent maintains some kind of knowledge base KB and can verify KB |= ϕ
for any ϕ entailed by KB .
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Fig. 2. Basic control flow of interest-based negotiation
are then used to decide whether (and how) new observations should be merged into
existing frames or whether they should be used to create a new frame.
For lack of space, we omit further details of this learning and decision-making pro-
cess. For our purposes, it shall suffice to note that m2InFFrA provides a framework for
decision-theoretic (boundedly) rational selection and long-term adaptation of dialogue
patterns in the form of simple interaction frames. This is achieved by providing agents
with an initial set of admissible patterns, to which they will add their experiences over
time. Based on similarity considerations and long-term accumulation of feedback re-
garding the usefulness of different frames in different interaction situations, they can
optimise their frame and action choices. In the following, we will use this architecture
for learning and decision-making in a complex social context, namely that of interest-
based negotiation.
4 Interest-Based Negotiation
In contrast to proposal-based negotiation, in which agents merely exchange propos-
als (such as contracts in contract nets, deals in bargaining or goods and prices in auc-
tions), argumentation-based negotiation [17] allows agents to exchange information
about their internal state in order to convince the other that a particular course of joint
action will be mutually beneficial. Interest-based negotiation (IBN) [18] is a particular
ABN framework which allows agents to argue over each others’ beliefs, goals, and the
means for achieving these goals. In this paper, we are concerned with a simplified vari-
ant of IBN in which an agents’ proposal may be (1) challenged by asking for reasons (in
terms of the agent’s beliefs, goals, etc.) that lead to her negotiation stance and (2) justi-
fied by the agent, whereupon the challenging agent may (3) attack this justification until
finally the attack, if successful, leads to a (4) concession that brings the agents closer
to an agreement. Figure 2 illustrates the basic control flow of the dialogues we model
here. The original IBN framework described in [18] enables more flexible dialogues
(e.g. involving shifts in focus during the dialogue). As a starting point and to make the
simulation viable, however, we consider only a subset of these possible dialogues and
explore strategy learning within this subset.10
The process of IBN can be seen as traversal of a so-called goal graph that facilitates
the representation of goal hierarchies, preferences and justifications. Each node in a
goal graph represents a fact or a goal, and directed links between goal nodes can be
used to represent goal hierarchies. Furthermore, a link (viz set of links) leading from a
fact (viz set of facts) to a goal node and labelled with an action identifier denotes that
execution of this action requires the respective fact to be true, and contributes to the
respective goal. In terms of the model presented in section 2, a goal graph constructed
from the arguments put forward by a specific agent can serve as a representation of this
agent’s public identity. An example of a goal graph for a particular domain will be given
in section 5.
What makes IBN attractive for the study of argumentation strategy learning and the
reason why IBN lends itself well to an implementation in m2InFFrA is that it provides
a rich set of social rules with which agents have to comply when engaging in rational
argumentation. The most prominent of these are:
1. No proposal can be considered viable if it cannot be implemented under current
circumstances, i.e. if its environmental preconditions are not met. If an agent is in-
formed (believably) that her proposal rests on false assumptions, she must withdraw
it.
2. A proposal has to be dropped if it can be shown that its effects have already been
achieved or that they are unachievable.
3. No proposal is acceptable that violates a higher-level goal even though it achieves
some lower-level goal. In fact, to make things more difficult we will require that a
proposal that jeopardises any goal will be considered unacceptable in our experi-
ments.
4. No alternative to a proposal can be rejected once the fact has been accepted that it
will achieve the alleged goal (i.e. if it achieves the same thing, there is no reason to
reject an alternative).
Quite interestingly, while these rules are based on principles of agent-level rationality
(some of them in fact reflect fundamental elements of BDI theory [5]), in an argumen-
tation scenario they constitute society-level rules of communicative behaviour: Any
agent who violates them would no longer be treated as rational by others and might
be excluded from the society altogether (simply for lacking the ability to participate in
reasonable communication).
In the context of m2InFFrA, these rules can be used directly to define argumentation
frames. Consider the two frames for single-shot11 IBN quoted from [20] and shown
in table 1, which implement rules 1 and 4, respectively. In the first frame, B justifies
her refusal to perform the proposed action X by pointing to a problem P that inhibits
10 In the remainder of the paper, we will use the term IBN to refer to this simpler version of
interest-based negotiation.
11 I.e., involving only one iteration of the challenge-justification-attack-concession loop shown
in figure 2. For lack of space, the frames developed in [20] for iterative IBN are omitted here.
D˙
→ request(A,B,X) → reject(B,A,X) → ask-reason(A,B,X)
→ inf-problem(B,A, P ) → concede(A,B, P )
¸
,
˙
{problem(P,X)}
¸
,
˙
〈〉
¸E
D ˙
→ request(A,B,X) → ask-reason(B,A,X) → inf-goal(A,B,G)
→ att-means(B,A,Y ) → concede(A,B, Y ) → do(B, Y )
¸
,
˙
{goal(A,G), achieves(X,G), achieves(Y,G),X 6= Y }
¸
,
˙
〈〉
¸E
Table 1. Example frames for single-shot IBN
execution of X . In the second frame, B attacks A’s justification for action X (namely
a goal G achieved by it) with an alternative action Y that achieves G as well. The logi-
cal predicates problem , goal and achieves in these examples (their meaning should be
obvious from the context) refer to knowledge states of the individual agents. While it
may be fairly easy for both agents to check specific instances of problem and achieves
(e.g. by “inspecting” the environment), this is certainly not the case for the goal predi-
cate. However, this statement still has to be consistent with the public identity of agent
A as given by her past (and future) statements. As a result, A cannot attack the al-
ternative means Y for achieving G, independent of the fact if she really holds G as a
goal.12
To allow for the exchange of multiple arguments, [20] further defines six frames
for iterative IBN, corresponding to a successful proposal, challenged proposal, and re-
jected proposal (i.e. edges leading out of the proposal node of figure 2) and to successful
challenge, successful justification, and successful attack (i.e. edges leading into the con-
cession node). Using these frames in practice (or, more precisely, using an indefinitely
long sequence of frames in a single encounter) requires a more complex control flow
than that currently possible in m2InFFrA (e.g. storing the state of a particular argument
or proposal when a shift in focus occurs). While beyond the scope of this paper, this cer-
tainly is on our research agenda in order to increase the expressiveness and flexibility
of m2InFFrA.
5 Experimental Results
As a proof of concept, interest-based negotiation using interaction frames has been
implemented and tested in the multiagent-based link exchange system LIESON. In this
system, agents representing Web sites engage in communication to negotiate over mu-
tual linkage with the end of increasing the popularity of one’s own site and that of other
preferred sites.
12 For reasons of simplicity, we suffice with this, somewhat naive, approach for handling the
complex notion of commitment in dialogue [24]. An elaborate account of commitment man-
agement is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Fig. 3. Part of the LIESON goal graph for the (sub)goal of increasing one’s own popularity (by
either obtaining an in-link with arbitrary rating value or increasing an having an existing link’s
rating value X be increased to Y ), which itself contributes to the (super)goal of increasing one’s
score
Available physical actions in this domain are the addition and deletion of numeri-
cally rated links originating from one’s own site and the modification of these ratings
(where the probability of attracting traffic through a link depends on the rating value).
Agent performance is computed based on the flow through the link network as well
as on private ratings the agents hold towards each other. It is worth noticing that these
private ratings also introduce a form of “social standing”, since linkage decisions by
higher rated agents have a greater impact on individual as well as overall performance.
Figure 3 shows a part of the goal graph for LIESON.
Technically, LIESON agents consist of a non-social BDI [19] reasoning kernel that
projects future link network configurations and prioritises goals according to utility
considerations. If these goals involve actions that have to be executed by other agents,
the m2InFFrA component starts a framing process which runs until the goal of com-
munication has been achieved or no adequate frame can be found. Note that the goal-
prioritising internal reasoning mechanism need not generate intentions that are in keep-
ing with the goal graphs talked about in conversations with other agents. This is exactly
what is meant by strategically exploiting the possibilities of public identity management
while pursuing one’s private agenda.
We report on two different sets of experiments in order to compare the performance
of simple proposal-based negotiation (PBN) to that of (single-shot) IBN. PBN has been
implemented by supplying agents with a set of frames that allow for requesting action
execution from another agent, proposing alternative actions, or proposing actions the
other has to perform in return for one’s cooperation. In contrast to the IBN case, agents
are free to perform or not perform these actions without giving a reason. Single-shot
IBN is realised using a set of frames, one for each path in the graph of figure 2 (two
examples for these were given in the previous section, for exact definitions of the re-
maining frames cf. [20]). As compared to proposal-based negotiation, IBN enforces a
much stricter communication regime by requiring agents to justify their stance, to ac-
cept any alternative suggested for the same goal, to abandon any proposal that threatens
at least one goal, etc. In particular, this also implies that agents cannot simply reject a
proposal because it does not seem desirable in terms of utility.
Figure 4 shows the average agent performance (in a society of ten agents) as well
as the individual performances of the best and worst agent for PBN (above) and IBN
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Fig. 4. Performance plots for proposal-based (above) vs. interest-based negotiation (below)
(below), both of them averaged over 50 independent runs. The constant lines depicted
in the plots correspond to benchmark values that are relevant in the linkage domain:
the lower benchmark corresponds to the average utility that can be achieved if every
agent “honestly” expresses her opinion towards any other agent by laying a link that is
weighted with her actual rating for the target site, while the upper benchmark is reached
if every agent lays “politically correct” links to all other agents by not laying any links
with negative ratings (i.e. concealing any critical views of other sites). Note that to start
off with, agents know nothing about these benchmarks and link configurations that will
yield high utility scores to them. In particular, laying more and more links in an honest
way is only slightly dominated by the strategically superior, politically correct linkage
pattern and it is quite impressive that agents achieve a performance close to the upper
benchmark.
The significance of the results shown in figure 4 is that the agents manage to attain
(and maintain) a reasonable level of long-term utility even under these stricter – and
much more realistic – circumstances (albeit with bigger fluctuations indicating frequent
“loss of an argument”). This illustrates nicely that m2InFFrA is capable of combining
decision-theoretic learning with complex knowledge-based reasoning about constraint-
governed conversation patterns. The ability to record experiences with certain commu-
nication patterns (by extending the pre-specified negotiation frames with new substitu-
tions and situation-dependent conditions) and to reinforce their use depending on the
environmental feedback obtained while using them in a particular interaction allows
agents to adapt not only to a set of communication patterns but in fact to the (evolving)
communication practice of a MAS.
The results also suggest that IBN has an equilibratory effect on the social out-
come since the utility difference between most and least successful agents is somewhat
smaller than is the case for proposal-based negotiation. Quite naturally, the requirement
to “give reasons” (and hence to act rationally in accordance with public identity) seems
to reduce the impact of “having more power”. Indeed, a closer look at individual inter-
actions reveals that agents are capable of “winning an argument” independent of their
power and that of their peer.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a practical, adaptive approach to argumentation for arti-
ficial agents. Starting with a brief discussion of the general issue of strategic interaction,
we have argued for a separation between internal reasoning and social behaviour to al-
low for the combination of the decision-theoretic design of a rational, self-interested
agent with the prescriptive, society-level constraints entailed by typical argumentation
protocols.
We have introduced the abstract architecture InFFrA and the notions of interaction
frames as a representation of a class of interaction in terms of surface structure and
contextual conditions and of framing as the process of strategically applying a set of
interaction frames and adapting them from experience.
We have further presented a simplified yet flexible version of interest based nego-
tiation, which allows for rejecting, challenging, justifying and attacking arguments in
the form of agents’ mental states. This version has then been implemented using a par-
ticular instance of InFFrA for two-party, turn-taking conversations. The feasibility of
the approach has been illustrated in a agent-based web linkage scenario, and its perfor-
mance has been shown to be comparable to that of simple proposal-based negotiation
while imposing much stricter and much more realistic constraints.
To our knowledge, the implementation of IBN frames in m2InFFrA constitutes both
the first practical approach and the first application of machine learning methods to
argumentation-based negotiation in MASs. In the future, we would like to extend frame
representations to enable more complex communication constraints and capture proto-
col information beyond simple turn-taking message sequences, in particular by allowing
cycles, branching and multi-party dialogues.
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